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1. INTRODUCTION 
The tax consequences of corporate liquidations generally are 
governed by sections 331 through 346 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 19541 (the Code). When one corporation desires to pur­
chase another corporation's assets, certain provisions of these sec­
tions come into play and serve an important role in the subsequent 
purchase and sale. This article will analyze some of the problems 
accompanying the use of liquidations in this setting. 2 Two recent 
decisions, Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Commis­
sioner3 and R.M. Smith, Inc. v. Commissioner4 form the founda­
tion of this article and illustrate the problematic tax consequences 
of corporate liquidations in the purchase and sale context. To ade­
quately understand the import of these two cases, a brief descrip­
tion of the development and operation of the law surrounding the 
use of corporate liquidations in the purchase of assets is required. 
* B.S. Southern Connecticut State College, 1975; J.D. Western New England 
College School of Law, 1979; associate in the law firm of Silverstein & Winters, P.C. 
New Haven, Ct. The author wishes to thank Professor Frederick D. Royal, Western 
New England College School of Law, for his valuable assistance. 
1. All section references, unless otherwise specified, are to the Internal Reve­
nue Code of 1954, as amended [hereinafter referred to as I.R.C.J. 
2. This article will analyze corporate liquidations as they relate to the results 
sought by §§ 336 and 337. Section 336 will be discussed in light of its interaction 
with § 334(b)(2). 
3. 65 T.C. 440 (1975), affd, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 
909 (1979). 
4. 69 T.C. 317 (1977), affd, 591 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1979). The Tax Court deci­
sion was a supplemental opinion filed to resolve a dispute on a Rule 155 computa­
tion. U.S. TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 155. The original decision is reported at T.C.M. 
(CCH) 97 (1977). 
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A corporation5 interested in purchasing another corporation's 
assets may achieve its goal by one of several methods. The target 
corporation6 may adopt a plan of complete liquidation and distri­
bute its assets in kind to its shareholders, who in turn will sell 
those assets to the acquiring corporation. Alternatively, the target 
may sell its assets directly to the purchaser, liquidate, and distrib­
ute the proceeds to its shareholders. A third alternative is a direct 
purchase by the acquiring corporation of the target's stock followed 
by a subsequent liquidation of the newly acquired subsidiary. 7 
While this article will describe the tax consequences surrounding 
each of the above three alternatives, its central analysis will focus 
upon a comparison of the latter two methods. Although purchase 
and sale agreements involve many nontax considerations, reducing 
the incidence of tax is certainly a primary objective of the parties. 
The acquiring corporation is concerned with obtaining a basis in 
the assets equal to the cost of the target corporation, while the 
target corporation is concerned with maximizing the after-tax8 
liquidating distribution!) to its shareholders. Each of the three 
methods yields the same economic result: the acquiring corporation 
purchases the target corporation's assets; the target corporation's 
shareholders receive the purchase price of the assets; and the tar­
get corporation ceases to exist. Recognizing this fact, Congress and 
the courts have sought to establish a uniform tax treatment regard­
less of the method of transfer. 
Prior to 19.54, however, the tax consequences of an asset pur­
chase were heavily dependent on the form of the transaction. 10 A 
direct sale of the assets by the corporate entity resulted in one tax 
at the corporate levelll and a second tax to the shareholders upon 
5. The purchasing corporation will hereinafter be referred to as the acquiring, 
purchaser, parent, or P corporation, depending on the context in which the tenn is 
used. 
6. The target corporation hereinafter will be referred to as the seller, subsidi­
ary, or S corporation, depending on the context in which the tenn is used. 
7. Once the acquiring corporation has purchased all the stock of the target cor­
poration, the target corporation becomes a wholly-owned subsidiary of the acquir­
ing corporation. 
8. The term "after-tax" in this context is somewhat misleading since the objec­
tives of the target corporation are not to lessen the incidence of tax at the corporate 
level but to eliminate it entirely. 
9. The terms "liquidating distribution" or "liqUidating dividend" generally re­
fer to amounts distributed in a partial or complete liquidation of a corporation. The 
taxation of these amounts is generally governed by § 331. 
10. See generally B. BITTKER & ]. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 11 11.63 (4th ed. 1979). 
11. I.R.C. of 1939, ch. 2, § 22{a), 53 Stat. 1 (now I.R.C. § 61). 
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receipt of the proceeds in the subsequent liquidating distribu­
tion. 12 The double taxation was avoided, though, if the liquidation 
preceded the sale. 13 This was possible because corporations did not 
recognize any gain or loss on the distribution of property 
in partial or complete liquidation. 14 The pitfalls of such a system 
were demonstrated by two well-known decisions, Commissioner v. 
Court Holding Co.15 and United States v. Cumberland Public 
Service CO.lS 
In Court Holding Co., the corporation completed negotiations 
for the sale of an apartment house, its sole asset. When the com­
pany realized that the sale would result in the imposition of a tax at 
the corporate level, consummation of the sale was postponed.17 At­
tempting to avoid this tax, the corporation, pursuant to a complete 
liquidation, transferred the bUilding to its shareholders, Minnie 
Miller and her husband, who thereupon conveyed the property to 
the buyer. 18 
Unfortunately for the Millers, their last minute change did not 
succeed. The form of the transaction was cast aside, and the gain 
on the sale was attributed to the corporation. 19 Since "[t]he inci­
dence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction . . . 
[a] sale by one person cann~t be transformed for tax purposes in­
to a sale by another by using the latter as a conduit . . . to pass 
title. "20 
Several years later the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Cumberland Public Service Co. to "clear up doubts 
arising out of [its decision in] the Court Holding Co. case. "21 In 
this situation, a group of shareholders succeeded where the Millers 
had failed. To avoid paying capital gains tax, Cumberland Public 
12. Id. § ll5(c) (now I.R.C. § 33J.(a», provides that amounts distributed in com­
plete liquidation are treated as full payment in exchange for the stock. 
13. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 332 n.3 (1945). 
14. This exemption was not statutory until the enactment of § 336 in 1954. Sec­
tion 336, however, merely codified prior judicial decisions and long-established 
Treasury Regulations. See, e.g., Stock Yards Bank v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 964, 
970 (1932); Houston Bros. Co. v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 804 (1930); Treas. Reg. ll8, 
§ 39.22(a)-20 (1939). 
15. 324 U.S. 331 (1945). 
16. 338 U.S. 451 (1950). 
17. 324 U.S. at 333. 
18. [d. 
19. [d. at 333-34. 
20. [d. at 334.. 
21. 338 U.S. at 453. 
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Service Co. rejected an offer to sell its assets, power transmission 
and distribution equipment, to a local electric power cooperative. 
At the same time, Cumberland's shareholders separately negotiated 
with the cooperative and offered to acquire the desired assets and 
sell them to the buyer. The offer was accepted. Cumberland Public 
Service Co. distributed the equipment in a partial liquidation and 
sold the remaining assets. The previously arranged sale occurred 
shortly afterward. The Court found that, although the sllareholders' 
motive was to remove the incidence of tax at the corporate level, 
the liquidation was genuine and the sale was arranged by the 
shareholders solely in their individual capacities. 22 Thus, under the 
facts presented, the sale could not be attributed to the corporation. 
The Court recognized the "oddities in tax consequences"23 
arising from the controlling statutes but accepted the congressional 
mandate contained therein. 24 Since "Congress . . . determined that 
different tax consequences shall flow from different methods by which 
. . . shareholders . . . may dispose of corporate property . . . [,] 
[i]t is for the trial court, upon consideration of an entire transac­
tion, to determine the factual category in which a particular trans­
action belongs. "25 
Although the real distinction between these two decisions, from 
a practical standpoint, could mean little more than that the Cum­
berland shareholders had received timely tax advice,26 the message 
was clear: to receive favorable tax treatment, mold the transaction 
to Cumberland. 27 With the tax consequences heavily dependent 
upon the form of the transaction,28 the legacy of these decisions 
was that the structure of the sale could constitute "a trap for the 
unwary. "29 
In 1954, Congress sought to eliminate this formalism by 
creating a parity of tax treatment at the corporate level by enacting 
section 337. 30 It generally provides that gain or loss realized sub­
22. Id. at 453. 
23. Id. at 455. 
24. Id. at 456. 
25. Id. For methods used to dispose of corporate property, examine those used 
by the Court Holding Co. and Cumberland shareholders. 
26. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 10, ~ 11.63, at 11-69. 
27. [d. 
28. H.R. REP. No. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] 3 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 4017, 4896. 
29. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 10, ~ 11.63, at 11-69. 
30. H.R. REP. No. 8300, 83d Congo 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] 3 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 4017, 4896. The legislative history pertinent to § 337(a) does not 
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sequent to the adoption of a plan for complete liquidation will not 
be recognized by the selling corporation. 31 Additionally, the enact­
ment of section 336 codified the long-established rule implemented 
unsuccessflllly by the Millers in Court Holding Co. and success­
fully by the Cumberland shareholders. It clearly provides that "no 
gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the distribution 
of property in partial or complete liquidation. "32 Thus, under 
the new provisions of the Code, the results in both Cumberland 
and Court Holding Co. would be identical. "[W]hether the 
corporation sells the assets and then distributes the proceeds in 
complete liquidation, or distributes the assets in kind to the 
shareholders for sale by them,"33 the incidence of tax at the corpo­
rate level is effectively removed. 
The acquiring corporation's search for parity of tax treatment 
underwent a similar evolution. Its problems, which related to the 
basis of the acquired assets, also were caused by the form of the 
transaction. While a direct purchase of assets has always yielded 
the normal cost basis,34 a stock purchase followed by a complete 
liquidation of the subsidiary has not always produced the same re­
sult. Pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 the purchaser 
received a carry-over basis, consisting of the seller's basis, in the 
distributed assets.35 With this system the basis of the assets often 
bore little or no relation to their fair market value36 or their cost 
basis had they been purchased directly. 
The system, therefore, fostered a disparity of basis treatment 
between a direct asset purchase and a stock purchase, depending 
specifically state that achieving parity at the corporate level was the section's under­
lying purpose. In many cases, however, the belief is expressed that parity was the 
goal of § 337. See Midland-Ross Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 1l0, 114-15 (6th 
Cir. 1973); Estate of Munter, 63 T.C. 663, 671-73 (1975). See also Central Tablet 
Mfg. Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1974) (concise summary of the legis­
lative history of § 337(a)). This section is commonly referred to as the "Anti-Court 
Holding Co." provision. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 10, ~ 11.64, at 11-70. 
31. l.R.C. § 337(c) delineates the limitations of this section. 
32. ld. § 336 (emphasis added). 
33. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 10, ~ 1l.63, at 11-69. 
34. l.R.C. of 1939, ch. 2, § 113(a), 53 Stat. 1 (now l.R.C. § 1012). 
35. ld. § 113(a)(15) (now l.R.C. § 334(b)(1)). For example, assume that the tar­
get corporation owns assets with a fair market value of $100 and an adjusted basis of 
$45. The acquiring corporation purchases the target's stock for $100, liquidates the 
target, and receives the assets in the subsequent liquidating distribution. Its basis in 
these assets is the target's basis of $45 and not the $100 cost to the acquiring corpo­
ration. 
36. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 10, ~ 1l.44, at 11-42. 
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on the manner of acquisition. To eliminate this problem and to cre­
ate parity for basis purposes between these two methods, courts 
devised what became known as the Kimbell-Diamond principle, 37 
now codified in section 334(b)(2)38 of the Code. In simple terms, 
this section provides that the purchase price of the stock will be­
come the parent corporation's basis in the assets. 39 In actuality, the 
basis is subject to certain refinements40 which maintain parity be­
tween the two methods of acquisition and reflect the realities of 
the transaction. 41 These refinements will be discussed at length in 
part IV of this article. 
Independent of each other, similar concepts of parity had 
evolved for both buyers and sellers. Theoretically, the tax treat­
ment of buyers as well as of sellers was identical regardless of the 
method of acquisition. This article will focus on the tax treatment 
of two purchase and sale techniques. The first method is one 
where the parties agree that the acquiring corporation is to pur­
chase the assets directly from the target corporation. Pursuant to 
section 337(a), the shareholders of the seller need not be con­
cerned with the problems that had confronted their predecessors in 
COliri Holding Co. and Cumberland. The target may sell the as­
sets, liquidate, and then distribute the proceeds to its shareholders 
without taxation at the corporate level. Thus, the shareholders re­
ceive the ilill benefits of the assets' value. On the opposite side of 
the transaction, the acquiring corporation receives a cost basis in 
the assets. 
The second method occurs when the negotiations result in a 
37. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74 (1950), afI'd per 
curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cat. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951). 
38. Section 334(b)(2)(B) provides, inter alia, that: 
[T]he basis of the property in the hands of the distributee shall be the ad­
justed basis of the stock with respect to which the distribution was made. 
For purposes of the preceding s~ntence, under regulations prescribed by the 
Secretary, proper adjustment in the adjusted basis of any stock shall be 
made for any distribution made to the distributee with respect to such stock 
before the adoption of the plan of liquidation, for any money received, for 
any liabilities assumed or subject to which the property was received, and 
for other items. 
39. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] 3 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 4017, 4247. "In general, the consequences prescribed under sec­
tion 334 reach results which permit the taxpayer to retain ... as the basis for the as­
sets received in complete or partial liquidation, the adjusted basis for his stock thus 
effectuating the principles of Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner. ..." 
ld. 
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(4) (1955). 
41. R.M. Smith, Inc. V. Commissioner, 69 T.C. at 335. 
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purciJase of the outstanding stock of the target corporation, making 
the target a wholly-owned subsidiary. In the sale of their stock, the 
target's shareholders again receive the full benefit of the assets' 
value without the dilution of taxes at the corporate level. This 
illustrates the first concept of tax parity: that shareholders get the 
full proceeds of assets without taxation at the corporate level. The 
purchaser, however, possesses a wholly-owned subsidiary corpora­
tion when all it desires is the subsidiary's assets. It therefore liqui­
dates the subsidiary and, in return for its recently purchased stock, 
receives the assets. Pursuant to section 336, there is no tax liability 
to the subsidiary. Pursuant to section 332,42 the parent similarly 
avoids the tax liability. The purchasing corporation's basis in the 
newly acquired assets is determined pursuant to section 334(b)(2) 
and theoretically equals the cost basis it would have received pur­
suant to the first method described. Consequently, tax parity has 
been provided to the purchaser as well. 
Since they are part of the same tax system, the two concepts 
of parity applicable to asset and stock purchases presumably are 
designed to operate in harmony. This harmony, if it existed, would 
be evidenced by the actual, not theoretical, elimination of tax con­
siderations as they relate to both methods of acquisition. As the 
holdings in Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Commis­
sioner43 and R.M. Smith, Inc. v. Commissioner44 will illustrate, 
however, the two concepts of parity may not achieve this result. 
This article will analyze the effect that Tennessee-Carolina, dealing 
with the parity established by sections 336 and 337 in the context 
of the tax benefit rule,45 and Smith, dealing with the fundamentals 
of section 334(b)(2), had upon the second method of acquisition, 
the stock purchase, described above. 46 The effect of these two 
42. Section 332(a} provides that "No gain or loss shall be recognized on the re­
ceipt by a corporation of property distributed in complete liquidation of another cor­
poration." 
43. 65 T.C. at 440. 
44. 69 T.C. at 317. 
45. The tax benefit rule is judicial in origin. It provides that if an amount previ­
ously deducted from income is recovered, the amount recovered is includable in in­
come. Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399, 401 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
If, however, no tax benefit resulted from the previous deduction when it was taken, 
the amount recovered is excluded. ld. at 401-02. In Alice Phelan, the plaintiff corpo­
ration had donated two parcels of realty and had claimed a charitable deduction. 
Seventeen years later, the donee reconveyed the property to the donor. The court 
held that the "recovery" of the property produced taxable income in the year it was 
recovered, to the extent of the previous charitable deduction. Id. at 399. 
46. It should be noted that the concept of parity, as treated in this article, is not 
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cases upon that method will in tum be compared with the results 
of a direct asset purchase in order to determine whether parity of 
tax treatment exists. 
II. TENNESSEE-CAROLINA AND THE TAX BENEFIT RULE 
In January 1967, Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. 47 
(Tennessee) purchased all the capital stock of Service Lines, Inc. 48 
(Service Lines). Two months later, pursuant to sections 332 and 
336, Service Lines declared a liquidating distribution and merged 
into its parent corporation. 49 The assets distributed to Tennessee 
included tires and tubes partly consumed but fully expensed,50 that 
is, fully deducted as an ordinary and necessary business expense, 
by Service Lines. Pursuant to section 334(b)(2) Tennessee claimed 
a stepped-up basis in the tires and tubes. 51 This amount was de­
rived by allocating the purchase price of the stock proportionately 
to each asset, based on its respective fair market value. 52 
Tennessee, the purchaser, and Service Lines, the seller, subse­
quently filed a consolidated retum53 in which Tennessee expensed 
limited to parity of tax treatment at the corporate level. Rather, the term "parity" en­
visions identical tax treatment for all parties involved in the transaction. A short ex­
ample will illustrate that the original enactment of § 337(a) resulted in parity not 
only at the corporate level but at all levels, providing equal tax treatment for all par­
ties involved. In analyzing the current validity of the tax benefit rule, the tax effect 
to all parties likewise must be examined. Assume seller corporation (S) has assets 
with a fair market value of $100,000. If purchasing corporation (P) buys these assets 
directly, the following tax treatment will occur. Pursuant to § 337(a) there is no tax to 
P and the full $100,000 is distributed to the shareholders of P who pay tax at capital 
gains rates. P then has assets with a cost basis of $100,000. Now suppose that instead 
of purchasing the assets directly, P purchases all the stock from the shareholders of 
S. The purchase price of the stock will be the same $100,000 on which the share­
holders of S will pay tax at the capital gains rates. Upon liquidation, S pays no tax 
and P, which receives the assets in the liquidating distribution, assigns them a basis 
of $100,000. See I.R.C. §§ 334(b)(2), 336. Thus, prior to the enactment of the recap­
ture provisions and prior to the use of the tax benefit rule, tax treatment to all parties 
was identical. 
47. Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. at 440. 
48. Id. at 441. 
49. [d. 
50. "Expensed" is a term of art referring to deductions for "ordinary and neces­
sary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or 
business...." I.R.C. § 162(a). 
51. Since the tires and tubes were fully expensed, their basis was zero. There­
fore, upon allocating a portion of the stock purchase price to these assets, their basis 
was stepped-up from zero to cost. Prior to the enactment of § 334(b)(2), the zero 
basis would have been carried over. 582 F.2d at 380. 
52. Id. 
53. See I.R.C. § 1501. 
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the allocated amount, that is, its basis in the tires and tubes, as an 
ordinary and necessary business expense. 54 
The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner and held that 
the tax benefit rule required Service Lines to include as income 
the value of the previously expensed tires and tubes. 55 On appeal, 
Tennessee argued that the tax benefit rule applies only when there 
is an economic recovery of a previously deducted amount. Here, 
Tennessee asserted that there had been no economic recovery by 
Service Lines. The assets were distributed within the meaning of 
section 336, and Service Lines received only worthless stock in ex­
change. 56 In a split decision, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit rejected this reasoning and upheld the Tax 
Court. The Sixth Circuit noted that previous decisions clearly had 
established that the tax benefit rule vitiated the nonrecognition 
provisions of section 337(a).57 Recall that section 337(a) provides 
that gain or loss realized subsequent to the adoption of a plan for 
complete liquidation will not be recognized by the selling corpora­
tion. 58 Tax benefit recovery, therefore, would be recognized under 
section 337(a). Since section 337(a) was enacted to foster a parity of 
tax treatment at the corporate level and to eliminate the formalistic 
distinctions created by Court Holding Co. and Cumberland,59 the 
majority reasoned that a failure to implement the tax benefit rule 
under section 336 would create an "unnecessary disparity" between 
the two statutes. 60 Consequently, the court required Service Lines 
to include the amount expensed and later recovered as income. 
Both courts declined to follow the Ninth Circuit's decision in 
C.l.R. v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 61 the only prior decision on this 
54. 582 F.2d at 380. 
55. 65 T.C. at 448. See text accompanying note 50 supra. 
56. 582 F.2d at 380. The assets of the corporation had been distributed; thus, 
there was no longer anything of value to support the value of the stock. 
57. See cases discussed in O'Hare, Statutory Nonrecognition of Income and 
the Overriding Principle of the Tax' Benefit Rule in the Taxation of Corporations 
and Shareholders, 27 TAX L. REV. 215, 222-33 (1972). 
58. 582 F.2d at 381 n.9; see I.R.c. § 337(a). 
59. See notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text. 
60. Although this seemed to be the policy underlying the majority's rationale, 
the requirement of a recovery was needed to trigger the application of the tax benefit 
rule. The court held that no actual physical recovery was necessary, and further, that 
the event of liquidation caused Service Lines to undergo a "fictional" recovery. 582 
F.2d at 382-83. See also Rev. Rul. 77-67, 1977-1 C.B. 33; Rev. Rul. 74-396, 1974-2 
C.B.106. 
61. 324 F.2d 837 (9th CiT. 1963), affg, 36 TC. 1027 (1961). The basic dispute 
in South Lake Farms stemmed from deductions that the acquired corporation had 
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point. In South Lake Fanns, the court relied upon a literal inter­
pretation of section 336. It detennined that under section 336, 
which for purposes of this article addresses itself to a stock pur­
chase transaction, the corporation received nothing;' stock, not as­
sets, was sold, and the shareholders received the money.62 The 
gain recognized by the shareholders could not be attributed to the 
corporation. Simply pllt, since nothing was received, there was no 
recovery of a previously deducted amount. The tax benefit rule 
therefore was inapplicable. The court fully realized that its result 
accorded a windfall to the previous shareholders. "They got a price 
for their stock that was enhanced by their corporation's expendi­
tures' which were deducted from its income, . . . even though it 
never got the income that the expenditures were expected to pro­
duce. "63 Nonetheless, since the language of section 336 clearly 
stated that no gain or loss is recognized by the corporation, any 
forthcoming remedy lay with Congress, not the courts. 64 
In Tennessee-Carolina, the court's reluctance to follow South 
Lake Fanns may have been due in part to its heightened 
awareness of the potential disparity resulting from application of 
the tax benefit rule to section 337 and not to section 336. The series 
of decisions holding that section 337 liquidations must yield to the 
tax benefit rule65 all were decided subsequent to South Lake Fanns. 
In any event, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits now are divided over 
the issue of whether the tax benefit rule overrides the nonrecog­
nition provisions of section 336. Most authorities66 seem to agree 
taken for the planting and preparation of barley and cotton crops. These crops in­
creased the fair market value of the acquired corporation's stock. The stockholders of 
the acquired corporation sold out to South Lake Farms, Inc. Pursuant to § 334(b)(2), 
the latter allocated the basis of its stock to the assets, including the cotton and barley 
crops. It subsequently expensed the adjusted basis of these assets. Id. at 841-42 
(Carter, J., dissenting). 
No income was recognized by the seller and the purchaser's deductions were al­
lowed. Therefore, a double deduction on the same items was allowed and the stock­
holders of the acquired corporation, by virtue of the sale of stock and not assets, 
avoided a tax at the corporate level and received a windfall. The Internal Revenue 
Service [hereinafter referred to as IRS] did not agree with the majority's rationale. 
Rev. Rul. 74-396, 1974-2 C.B. 106. 
62. 324 F.2d at 839. 
63. Id. at 840. 
64. [d. 
65. See note 57 supra and accompanying text. 
66. See Bonovitz, Problems in Achieving Parity in Tax Treatment Under Sec­
tions 337 and 334(b)(2), 34 N.Y.U. TAX INST. 57,113-14 (1976); O'Hare, Application 
of Tax Benefit Rule ill New Case Threatens Certain Liquidations, 44 J. TAX: 200 
(1976). See generally B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 10, ~ 11.65, at 11-84. 
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that regardless of whether a true "recovery" exists, the failure to 
apply the tax benefit rule to section 336 would foster a disparity 
supposedly put to rest by the Eighty-third Congress. 67 Before one 
may assess the true impact of Tennessee-Carolina's holding, how­
ever, the post-Smith status of section 334(b)(2) must be scrutinized. 
III. R.M. SMITH, INC. AND SECTION 334(b)(2) 
Smith presented the Tax Court with an opportunity to closely 
examine the basis refinements of section 334(b)(2) and their appli­
cation. 68 The purchaser, R. M. Smith, Inc., acquired all the stock 
of the seller, Gilmour Co. The seller owned certain assets subject 
to recapture liability upon liquidation. Recapture can be conceptual­
ized as another variation of the tax benefit rule. Depreciation deduc­
tions taken against ordinary income are based upon an estimation of 
the depreciable asset's useful life and salvage value. At the end 
of the asset's useful life its adjusted basis, its original basis minus 
the deductions for depreciation, ideally is equal to its fair market 
value. In instances where the value exceeds the basis it becomes 
apparent that excessive deductions have been taken. If the asset 
is sold, the difference between the adjusted basis and the amount 
received is taxed as ordinary income even though the property may 
be a capital asset and otherwise subject to favorable capital gains 
treatment. In selling the asset the owner has recaptured the 
excessive depreciation deductions previously credited against ordi­
nary income, therefore the amount recaptured is subject to taxa­
tion at ordinary income rates. 69 
In Smith the "existence of these liabilities was recognized by 
... [R.M. Smith, Inc.] and ... the agreed-upon stock purchase 
price took these liabilities into account. "70 Accordingly, the pur­
67. Midland-Ross Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 110, 114-15 (6th Cir. 1973); 
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Congo 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] 3 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 4017, 4244. 
68. 69 T.C. at 317. One author has stated that despite the considerable number 
of transactions involving § 334(b)(2), there is scant authority in the area. Smith is 
one of the few cases dealing with "how (rather than whether) § 334(b)(2) is to ap­
ply." Silverman, Leave it to Smith (or, "Refinements" on Section 334(bX2)), 33 TAX. 
L. REV. 545, 546 (1978). 
Smith relied heavily on another of these "few" cases, First Nat'l State Bank v. 
Commissioner, 51 T.C. 419 (1968), for guidance in determining "refinements" for 
earnings and profits pursuant to § 334(b)(2). Refinements will be discussed in de­
tail in the text accompanying notes 96-127 infra. 
69. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1245, 1250. 
70. 69 T.C. at 322. 
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chase price was adjusted downward to account for the tax liability as­
sumed by Smith, the buyer. 71 Upon liquidation by Smith, the 
court determined the fair market value of the assets to be equal to 
the purchase price of the stock, plus taxes and other miscellaneous 
liabilities assumed by the purchaser. 72 The court next determined 
that the net recapture amount, the total amount of excessive de­
preciation recaptured minus the tax liability attributed to that 
amount, qualined as interim earnings and pronts within the mean­
ing of the treasury regulations and therefore qualifIed for an up­
ward rennement of basis. 73 In other words, the net recapture, or 
earnings and pronts, was realized subsequent to the purchase and 
prior to the liquidating distribution. The historical background of 
section 334(b)(2) illustrates that interim earnings and pronts consti­
tute one of the rennements designed to maintain parity between a 
direct purchase and stock purchase and thus reflects the realities of 
the transaction. 74 
To achieve this result the court relied heavily upon its previ­
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 320-22. Petitioner Smith argued that the fair market value of the as­
sets was equal to the purchase price of the stock. The court, however, held that the 
proper amount must reflect the total consideration paid. Since the petitioner was 
aware of the potential tax liabilities, taxes and other miscellaneous liabilities as­
sumed by the purchaser also had to be added into the fair market value of the assets. 
Id. 
This procedure prevents the purchasing corporation from lowering its price 
based on the recapture tax liability and subsequently predicating its liability on the 
lower purchase price. In Smith, however, the petitioner had a different motive. The 
valuation of the intangible assets received by petitioner was calculated by the resid­
ual valuation method. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 97, 105, 112-13 (1977). This method entails 
subtracting the fair market value of the tangible assets from the total cost of the as­
sets to obtain the fair market value of the intangible assets. 
By increasing the ... starting figure [cost], respondent [Government] ob­
tains a greater value for intangibles and thereby reduces the extent to which 
refined adjusted basis will be allocated to the tangible (and depreciable) as­
sets. In this regard, it is important not to confuse refined adjusted basis with 
the cost figure.... The latter figure is essential herein only for the purpose 
of placing a value on intangibles under the residual valuation method. Once 
intangibles are assigned a fair market value, the refined adjusted basis ... is 
allocated among all assets, tangible and intangible, in proportion to their re­
spective fair market values. 
69 T.C. at 321 nA. A lower starting figure was clearly the petitioner's goal. 
73. Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(4)(v)(a)(2) (1955). The court relied on First National 
and concluded that the recapture liability was dependent on the liquidation of the 
subsidiary and not on the purchase price of the stock. The recaptured amount was 
recognized between acquisition and liquidation and therefore qualified for the re­
finement treatment. 69 T.C. at 324-25. 
74. Id. at 335 (citations omitted). 
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ous decision in First National State Bank of New Jersey v. Com­
missioner.75 In that case, the subsidiary, upon liquidation, was re­
quired to include its bad debt reserve as income. 76 Conceptually, 
both recapture and recovery of bad debt reserves are codified ver­
sions of the tax benefit rule. 77 The central issue in First National 
was whether inclusion of the bad debt reserve as income resulted 
in a corresponding increase in earnings and profits and, if so, 
whether it would be reflected in the basis of the assets received 
from the subsidiary upon liquidation. 78 The parties had stipulated 
earlier that the tax liability attributable to the recovered amount 
was a proper upward refinement to the basis of the stock. 79 
The First National court concluded that the amount of the bad 
debt reserve included as income, minus the corresponding tax lia­
bility, caused an increase in earnings and profits. The court thus 
arrived at the issue of whether the earnings and profits had accu­
mulated during the interim period between acquisition and liquida­
tion as prescribed by the regulations. 8o If so, the taxpayer would 
be entitled to an upward refinement to the stock's purchase price. 
Initially, the court accepted the treasury regulations as a reason­
able interpretation of section 334(b)(2).81 These regulations purport 
to remove the effects of a delayed liquidation by utilizing refine­
ments to compute the purchaser's basis in the newly acquired as­
sets. The basis then reflects the true value of the acquired stock. 
Just as the adjusted basis for assets acquired in a direct pur­
chase theoretically reflects their value or cost on the date pur­
chased, so should the basis for assets acquired by stock purchase 
reflect their value on the date received in the liquidating distribu­
tion. The stock purchase price, however, reflects only the target's 
75. 51 T.C. 419 (1968). 
76. Id. at 422-23. Since the bad debt reserve was no longer needed, it was con­
sidered "recovered" within the meaning of the tax benefit rule. This rationale, which 
was undisputed by the taxpayer, was held invalid in a subsequent case, Nash v. 
United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970). In Nash, the Supreme Court held that for the pur­
pose of applying the tax benefit rule, "end of need" was not synonymous with "re­
covery." Id. at 3-4. But see B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 10, ~ 11.65, at 
11-84. 
77. Sections Ill, 1245, and 1250 all incorporate the basic principles of the tax 
benefit rule. That is, the sections all involve a previously taken deduction which was 
later recovered in the course of a taxable event. See generally text accompanying 
note 69 supra. 
78. 51 T.C. at 425. 
79. Id. 
80. The regulation is discussed in note 73 supra. 
81. 51 T.C. at 427. 
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financial condition on the sale date. If the liquidation is not imme­
diate, the refinements provided in the regulations allow the pur­
chaser, essentially, to adjust the value of the stock to reflect the in­
terim business transactions and thus accurately depict the target's 
financial condition on the liquidation date. 
The Tax Court in First National applied the regulation's re­
finements and determined that the earnings and profits indeed had 
been accumulated during the interim period commencing "on the 
date of purchase and ending upon the date of the last distribution 
in liquidation. "82 As a result, the regulations required an upward 
refinement to the stock's purchase price equal to the full amount of 
the bad debt reserve. 83 
As indicated by at least one private letter ruling,84 the Inter­
nal Revenue Service (IRS) did not adhere to First National when 
issuing technical advice. In that ruling the IRS implicitly conceded 
that the income recovery from recapture resulted in an increase in 
earnings and profits. Although fully aware of the similarities be­
tween recapture and recovery of bad debt reserve,85 the IRS main­
tained that the realized earnings and profits were not the kind of 
interim earnings and profits contemplated by the regulations. 86 In 
Smith, the IRS anticipated that the Tax Court would hold, as it did, 
that the rationale of First National controlled. The IRS, therefore, 
alternatively argued that the "substituted basis" provision,87 also 
contained in the regulations, prevented the upward refinement or 
step-up in basis. 
The use of this provision of the treasury regulations is most 
prevalent in sales of assets during the postacquisition and preliqui­
dation interim. It provides a mechanism for the accurate computa­
tion of the gain or loss on a particular asset that is attributable 
82. Treas. Reg. § 1.334(c)(4)(v)(a)(2) (1955). 
83. Assume that a bad debt reserve of $10,000 was recovered into income. At a 
50% tax rate this would consist of a tax liability of $5,000 and earnings and profits of 
$5,000. The refinements pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(4)(v)(a)(1), (2) (1955) 
would increase the assets' basis by $10,000. 
84. Private Letter Ruling No. 7750009, issued Dec. 15, 1977, reprinted in 
Horvitz, 268 T.M. Depreciation Recapture-Corporate Transactioll B-21 (1978). The 
Commissioner of the IRS conceded that his position was contrary to the rationale of 
First Natiollal. Id. at B-24. Private letter rulings may not be used or cited as prece­
dent. 
85. See text accompanying note 69 supra. 
86. Private Letter Ruling No. 7750009, reprillted ill Horvitz, supra note 84, at 
B-24. 
87. Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(4)(vi)(a) (1955). 
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solely to the interim period. Under the regulation the adjusted ba­
sis of the stock allocable to the asset sold is substituted for that as­
set's true basis. Thus, assume the target owned a particular asset 
with an adjusted basis of $75,000 and a fair market value of 
$100,000 as of the date the stock was purchased. The purchase 
price of the stock allocable to this asset is $100,000. If this item is 
sold for $110,000 prior to the date of the liquidating distribution, 
the gain, for purposes of computing the interim earnings and pro­
fits, is calculated in the following manner. A new basis, determined 
by reference to the purchase price of the stock, here $100,000, is 
substituted for the true basis of $75,000. Therefore, the gain on the 
sale is $10,000, not $35,000. Upon liquidation the adjusted basis of 
the target's stock is increased by $10,000 to $110,000. 88 
As the IRS argued in Smith, this rule would prevent an up­
ward refinement for the portion of earnings and profits attributable 
to the amount of recapture. To simplifY what actually occurred in 
Smith, assume that the target possessed an asset with a fair market 
value of $200,000 and an adjusted basis of $100,000 which was sub­
ject to $100,000 recapture. Assuming a fifty percent tax rate on or­
dinary income, the IRS would allow the $50,000 refinement for the 
assumed tax liability attributable to the recapture, but it would 
deny the refinement for the $50,000 of earnings and profits by ap­
plying the substituted basis rule and calculating the interim earn­
ings and profits using a basis figure of $200,000. According to this 
method the amount of interim earnings and profits would equal 
zero, the $200,000 sale price minus the asset's $200,000 adjusted 
basis. 
The Smith court rejected this contention as a misconstruction 
of the regulation's underlying purpose: to neutralize the effects of 
a delay in liquidation on the purchaser's basis in the acquired as­
sets. The court reasoned that since the amount of recapture was 
caused by the liquidation and was not a function of its timing, the 
rationale for invoking the substituted basis provision did not ex­
ist. 89 As a result of the court's rejection of the substituted basis 
rule and its application of section 1.334-1(c)(4)(v)(a)(2) of the regula­
tions, the purchaser received an additional upward refinement to 
88. [d. 
89. 69 T.e. at 327. See B. BI'ITKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 10, ~ 11,45, at 
11-40 to 11-42 for examples of this adjustment. See also Silverman, supra note 68, at 
560. 
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its basis in the acquired assets. 90 This rationale, applicable here in 
a recapture context, also would apply in the tax benefit situation. 
In Tennessee-Carolina 91 the amount recovered by Service Lines 
would have been the same had Service Lines liquidated immedi­
ately instead of two months subsequent to the acquisition. 
This refinement for the interim earnings and profits is the root 
of the potential disparity between a direct purchase of assets and a 
stock purchase. 92 Assume, for example, that Purchaser (P) has one 
asset with a fair market value of $200,000 subject to $100,000 re­
capture. In a direct asset purchase, P will pay Seller (S) $200,000 
and will receive a $200,000 cost basis in the asset. S then will pay 
the recapture tax liability. If P purchases the stock from S's share­
holders, the purchase price will be reduced by the amount of the 
potential recapture tax liability, $50,000, to arrive at a purchase 
price of $150,000;93 and P will assume the tax liability of $50,000. 
Additionally, the $100,000 recapture generates $50,000 of earnings 
and profits. 94 On these facts, the basis of the asset would be 
$250,000, calculated by adding to the $150,000 stock purchase 
price $50,000 in assumed tax liability and $50,000 in earnings and 
profits. The result is that P, having "spent" $200,000, receives a 
basis of $250,000, $50,000 higher than the basis it would have re­
ceived in a direct asset purchase. 95 This result clearly appears to 
be contrary to the underlying policy of section 334(b) (2), which at­
tempts to achieve parity for basis purposes, and quite possibly is a 
misinterpretation of the regulations. 
Assuming that the Smith court's treatment of assets subject to 
recapture will be applied to ·assets subject to the tax benefit rule, 
the following section describes the overall effect of these decisions 
on our central parity concepts. 
90. See Treas. Reg. § L334-1(c)(4)(v)(a)(2) (1955). 

9L 65 T.e. at 440. See text accompanying notes 47-67 supra. 

92. Although some authorities may agree that the step-up for earnings and pro­
fits is allowable under a strict interpretation of the regulations, they also agree that 
parity is distorted because a higher basis is achieved through a stock purchase. See 
Bonovitz, supra note 66, at 93-102; McCaffrey, Tax Aspects of Liquidating a Subsidi
ary Recently Acquired by Purchase, 56 TAXES 858, 866-67 (1978); Miller, Section 
334(b)(2) and the Smith Case, 56 TAXES 691, 692-93 (1978); O'Hare, 16-4th T.M. Liq­
uidation of Subsidiaries-Basis-§ 334(b)(2), at A-19 to A-22 (1978); SilVerman, su
pra note 68, at 558-64. 
93. See text accompanying note 71 supra; Bonovitz, supra note 66, at 90-92; 
McCaffrey, supra note 92, at 860. 
94. See text accompanying notes 72 & 73 supra. 
95. Id. See also Treas. Reg. § L334-1(c)(4) (1955). 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
To recall briefly the analytic parameters of this discussion, 
there is currently a split between the Sixth and Ninth Circuits on 
the application of the tax benefit rule to section 336 distributions. 
Tennessee-Carolina, without statutory authority96 and influenced 
by overriding parity considerations, apparently has redefined the 
recovery requirement of the tax benefit rule. 97 The Ninth Circuit 
previously had declined to take a similar route and instead referred 
the task 'to Congress. 98 The eventual elimination of this split, ab­
sent congressional intervention, must await further decisions. 
Smith meanwhile has undertaken a close examination of sec­
tion 334(b)(2). This analysis seeks to compare the tax treatment of a 
direct asset with a stock purchase acquisition when one applies 
Smith's interpretation of the section 334(b)(2) refinements to a real­
ization of tax benefit income. 
The upward refinement for earnings and profits derived from 
r€1capture and similar provisions has been the subject of much criti­
cal commentary.99 In fact, a comparison of Smith and First Na­
tional indicates that the judiciary itself is unsettled in its approach 
to the problem. These two decisions treated the amount of earn­
ings and profits allowed in the upward refinement in significantly 
different fashions. In First National the court allowed the entire 
amount of net earnings and profits into the stepped-up basis, 100 
whereas in Smith the upward refinement was computed on a pro 
rata basis101 based on an average monthly earnings and profits 
amount for the portion of the fiscal year that had elapsed before 
liquidation. This method of computation was not at issue in Smith 
because neither party disputed its accuracy.l02 The computation 
was predicated on the following information. On the date of liqui­
dation, nine months had elapsed in the subsidiary's fiscal year, and 
two months had elapsed from the time of acquisition until liquida­
tion. An average monthly earnings and profits figure was derived 
for the nine-month period and multiplied by two, the number of 
96. I.R.C. § 1245 recapture does not encompass a recovery of costs expensed 
pursuant to § 162. Similarly, the § 111 tax benefit rule is inapplicable. See also 
O'Hare, supra note 66, at 201-04. 
97. Id. at 200. 
98. See text accompanying notes 61-64 supra. 
99. See note 92 supra. 
100. 51 T.C. at 427-28; see text accompanying notes 82 & 83 supra. 
101. 69 T.C. at 323-34. 
102. Id. at 328. 
216 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:199 
months in the interim period. loa This figure comprised the upward 
refinement for earnings and profits. 
This manner of calculation would effect a result drastically dif­
ferent from that reached in First National. If a corporation were 
liquidated immediately upon acquisition, as in First National, the 
pro rata calculation applied in Smith would deny a step-up for 
earnings and profits. The purchasing corporation reaps the full ben­
efit of the earnings and profits refinement only if it delays liquida­
tion for a full year. This calculation appears to achieve a result sim­
ilar to the one achieved through the use of the substitute basis 
rule. 104 Recall that since the substitute basis rule purports to re­
move the effects of a delayed liquidation, a corporation liquidated 
immediately receives no refinement. Under the Smith pro rata ap­
proach, an immediate liquidation would- result in zero refinements. 
This result is confusing since the Tax Court in both Smith and First 
National held that the recovered amounts constituted earnings and 
profits based on the distribution of assets in liquidation subsequent 
to acquisition. 105 Since the income was attributable to the liquida­
tion of the subsidiary, it was incorrect for the Smith court to calcu­
late the interim earnings and profits on a pro rata basis. 106 
Whether the earnings and profits refinement should be pro 
rata or complete, the earlier mentioned criticism remains: pur­
chasing stock, in lieu of acquiring assets directly, affords the 
purchasing corporation a greater stepped-up basis. 107 Although par­
ity of basis treatment, as originally conceived by Kimbell-Diamond 
Milling Co. v. Commissioner,108 cannot be effectuated through the 
mechanism of section 334(b)(2) and its regulations, an application of 
this section's principles to the concept of parity, as sought by sec­
tions 336 and 337, may demonstrate their validity. Recall that par­
ity for the purposes of this article is defined as equality in tax treat­
ment, not necessarily in tax result. 
103. [d. at 324. 
104. See note 87 supra and accompanying text. 
105. 69 T.C. at 325 (citing First Nat'l State Bank v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. at 
427-28). 
106. "Under no circumstances could the depreciation recapture be considered 
earned over the entire nine-month period. It was clearly attributable to the time of 
liquidation and either all should have been considered or none of it." McCaffrey, su­
pra note 92, at 867. 
107. See notes 92-94 supra and accompanying text. 
108. 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aJfd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
342 U.S. 827 (1951). 
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Two commentators have suggested that the additional step-up 
for earnings and profits, beyond the consideration actually paid, 
renders application of the tax benefit rule to section 336 meaning­
less for basis purposes. 109 This perspective can be outlined as fol­
lows. Assume Parent (P) decides to purchase all the stock of Sub­
sidiary (5) and subsequently to liquidate 5 to obtain its assets. The 
sole assets of S are previously expensed tires and tubes with a fair 
market value of $100,000. P pays the shareholders of S $100,000 
for their stock. Upon liquidation, S must recognize $100,000 of in­
come. This amount produces a tax liability of $50,000 and earnings 
and profits of $50,000. 110 P's basis in the assets will be $200,000, 
consisting of the $100,000 stock price, $50,000 tax liability, plus 
$50,000 earnings and profits. P then may expense the tires and 
tubes at $200,000, thereby offsetting the income of $100,000 recog­
nized by S and reported on the consolidated return and providing 
an additional $100,000 deduction. Also, the original shareholders of 
S receive a windfall on their stock. If P had purchased the assets 
directly, however, they would have received only $50,000. 111 Par­
ity is potentially destroyed on all fronts. 
From a pragmatic viewpoint, this transaction yields the incor­
rect result. When a corporation expects to encounter recapture lia­
bility after the liquidation, the purchase price is adjusted down­
ward. 112 This reflects p's assumption that S will face recapture tax 
liability. This more realistic scenario, outlined in the following hy­
pothetical, will cause a much different result than that explained 
above. P reduces the purchase price to $50,000 and assumes the 
$50,000 tax liability upon liquidation. p's basis in the tires and 
tubes will be $150,000, computed as follows: $50,000 for the stock; 
$50,000 for the tax liability; and $50,000 for the earnings and pro­
109. Morrison, Assignment of Income and Tax Benefit Principles in Corporate 
Liquidations, 54 TAXES 902, 917-18 (1976); O'Hare, supra note 66, at 202-3. 
110. This calculation, as with all the calculations in this article, presupposes an 
effective tax rate of 50% on ordinary income. 
111. If P purchased the assets directly from S, it would have to pay income tax 
on this recovered amount. This leaves $50,000 available for distribution to the share­
holders. A direct sale of their stock for $100,000 naturally yields more after capital­
gains-tax dollars. 
112. See R.M. Smith, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. at 322. See also Bonovitz, 
supra note 66, at 90-92; McCaffrey, supra note 92, at 860. This decision by the pur­
chaser allows him to obtain the asset with a lower initial expenditure. The stockhold­
ers of the acquired corporation will receive the same for their stock as in a direct as­
set acquisition. 
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fits. 113 This result, at the very least, eliminates the windfall to S's 
former shareholders. 
Now consider the result of the above hypothetical in the con­
text of a direct asset purchase. P pays S $100,000 taxable at fifty 
percent with the remaining $50,000 being distributed to S's share­
holders in a liquidating distribution. F's basis in the newly acquired 
assets, which it subsequently will deduct as an expense item, is 
$100,000. In the last two examples, the original shareholders of S 
received $50,000, a result illustrating that parity exists between the 
two alternatives. In the second example, P may expense its 
$100,000 basis in the tires and tubes. This is the exact amount 
which it originally paid. In the first example, the stock purchase, P 
has a stepped-up basis of $150,000. When S includes the tax bene­
fit income of $100,000 on the consolidated return, it washes or 
equals P's "refinements" and leaves a potential deduction of 
$50,000 which is exactly the amount it originally paid. Although 
the dollar amounts in the two examples are different, the tax treat­
ment is identical. In either case the purchaser eventually obtains a 
deduction equal to his original expense. If the refinements in the 
stock purchase acquisition do not include a full step-up for earnings 
and profits, P would be penalized for purchasing stock instead of 
assets. 114 Any potential deduction would be negated due to the in­
clusion of the tax benefit income. The result presented assumes 
that the pro rata earnings and profits step-up applied to the recap­
ture in Smith is erroneous115 and would not be used. If the IRS 
challenges this transaction and follows Smith instead of First Na­
tional, the result described above will fluctuate according to the 
timing of the transaction. 
These various adjustments and tax benefit recoveries establish 
a "rough parity" between the two methods of asset acquisition. The 
term "rough parity" is appropriate because, although the tax treat­
ment accorded the parties to asset acquisitions is equal, the result 
113. Recall that the amount recovered or recaptured into income generates 
earnings and profits as well as a tax liability. Here, the amount recovered, $100,000, 
if taxed at 50% would produce $50,000 of earnings and profits and a $50,000 tax bill. 
114. It is precisely on this point that Messrs. Morrison and O'Hare feel the tax 
benefit rule is meaningless in a § 336 context. Morrison, supra note 109, at 902; 
O'Hare, supra note 66, at 200. If, however, there is no step-up, the deduction washes 
and the purchaser is penalized for buying the stock. Secondly, the step-up cuts ofT 
any windfall to the stockholders of S. Without the tax benefit rule they receive an 
obvious windfall. See note 111 supra. 
115. See text accompanying notes 104-06 supra. 
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from a revenue collection perspective is unequal. A reexamination 
of the two examples illustrates why. Assume the facts are identical 
except that P has $500,000 of income unrelated to the acquisition. 
Column I of the table set forth below illustrates the result pursuant 
to a stock purchase, while Column II reflects the result pursuant to 
a direct purchase. In Column I, assuming that P may deduct its to­
tal stepped-up basis, the total tax collected is $225,000. In Column 
II the total revenue collected is 
$200,000 from P. 
COLUMN I 

Stock Purchase 

Sections 334(b)(2) and 336 

Transaction Amount 
(in thousands) 
1. 	 Purchase price 
of stock 
2. 	 P corp.'s other 
income 
3. S corp.'s tax 
benefit income 
4. P corp.'s gross 
income 
5. 	 Deduction for 
expensed assets 
6. 	 Adjusted gross 
income 
7. 	 Tax paid by P 
(50% rate) 
8. 	 Total tax 
revenue to 
government 
$50 
$500 
$100 
$600 
($150) 
$450 
$225 
$225 
$250,000, $50,000 from Sand 
COLUMN II 

Direct Purchase 

Section 337 

Transaction Amount 
(in thousands) 
1. 	 Purchase price 
of assets $100 
2. 	 S corp.'s tax 
benefit income $100 
3. 	 Tax paid by 
S corp. $50 
(50% rate) 
4. 	 P corp.'s gross 
income $500 
5. 	 Deduction for 
expensed assets {$100) 
6. 	 Adjusted gross 
income $400 
7. 	 Tax paid by P $200 
(50% rate) 
8. 	 Total tax 
revenue to 
government $250 
Before one may argue that the variance between the tax paid 
by S and P in Column II demonstrates inequitable tax treatment, 
several policies must be considered. First, there are advantages 
and disadvantages to either route of asset acquisition. None of 
these considerations amounts to the use of "mere formalisms, 
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which exist solely to alter tax liabilities. . . . "116 Indeed, in the di­
rect acquisition of Column II, the tax paid by P is less than that 
paid in Column 1,117 yet the bottom line represents greater tax 
revenue for the federal coffers. 
The purchasing corporation's choice may hinge on many fac­
tors, including the basis allocation pursuant to section 334(b)(2) and 
the accompanying regulations. us Regulation section 1.334-1(c) 
(4)(viii) provides that the adjusted refined basis ordinarily shall be 
allocated to the assets received in proportion to their net fair mar­
ket values.1l9 The net fair market value is defined in the regula­
tions as an asset's "fair market value less any specific mortgage or 
pledge to which it is subject. "120 This applies to both tangible and 
intangible property whether or not it is depreciable or amortizable. 
It does not apply to cash or its equivalent. Once an asset's basis 
has been determined, the basis is increased by the amount of any 
specific lien, mortgage, or pledge against the asset. 
The Commissioner's current position with regard to these ad­
ditions to basis is quite significant. Theoretically, recapture or tax 
benefIt liability may be attributed directly to certain assets121 and, 
for basis purposes, may be treated as a specific lien. The govern­
ment originally adhered to this theory122 but no longer does. The 
Commissioner currently treats recapture liability as an unsecured 
liability.123 Presumably, tax benefit income will be treated in a 
similar fashion. This normally has the effect of diluting the purchas­
er's current deductions because a portion of the refInements will 
be allocated to the basis of the nondepreciable assets. This princi­
116. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. at 334. 
117. Note that S pays a tax of $50,000 on the $100,000 received in the direct 
purchase. 
118. Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(4)(viii) (1955). 
119. Id. Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(4)(viii) (1955) provides in part: 
Except as provided in the preceding sentence, the amount of the adjusted 
basis of the stock adjusted as provided in this paragraph shall be aliocated as 
basis among the various assets received (except cash and its equivalent) both 
tangible and intangible (whether or not depreciable or amortizable). Ordi­
narily, such allocation shall be made in proportion to the net fair market 
values of such assets on the date received (the net fair market value of an as­
set being its fair market value less any specific mortgage or pledge to which 
it is subject). To that portion of the basis thus determined, for each property 
against which there is a lien, should be added the amount of such lien. 
120. [d. 
121. See O'Hare, supra note 66, at 203. 
122. See Morrison, supra note 109, at 921. 
123. See Private Letter Ruling No. 7750009, reprinted in Horvitz, supra note 
84, at B-24. 
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pIe can be explained in terms of the previous hypothetical, where 
the stock purchase price was reduced to $50,000. 124 It is 
foreseeable that P's final basis, including refinements, of $150,000, 
will be allocated as follows: $100,000 to the tires and tubes, repre­
senting their appraised value; and $50,000 to the remaining assets 
in proportion to their fair market values. If the $.50,000 is allocated 
to goodwill, a nondepreciable asset, P loses the deduction. There­
fore p's current deduction for the tires and tubes will be a wash 
against the recovered income, and the remaining $50,000 of refine­
ments is allocated among the other assets, including goodwill. P re­
ceives no immediate, favorable tax result; its current dollars have 
secured only future deductions, not current ones, as in a section 
337 direct acquisition. 
The main advantage to the buyer is that he may obtain the as­
sets with less money through a stock purchase. That is, the pur­
chaser spends less after-tax dollars. Of course the buyer also must 
be advised of the nontax reasons for refusing to buy the stock. 125 
Section 337 transactions are generally less complex. Here the 
buyer and seller can assign the cost basis to a particular asset, thus 
securing the buyer's immediate deduction of expense items. 126 The 
buyer, however, as illustrated in Columns I and II must provide 
more after-tax dollars to purchase the assets. 
In deciding which method of acquisition is preferable, the 
buyer must examine several factors prior to the transaction. Parity 
is evident in the tax treatment of direct asset purchases and stock 
purchases, but the buyer must evaluate the advantages and disad­
vantages in light of his own circumstance. If parity originally was 
meant to eliminate this kind of decisionmaking, rather than simply 
to divorce tax treatment from the form of a transaction, then parity 
may be an impossible goal. If so, the more logical recourse may be 
to refuse to apply recapture or tax benefit rules to either section 
336 or 337. Legislative fiat may be the answer. Congress, however, 
has not been active in this area, and the IRS has allowed the regu­
lations to section 334(b)(2) to lie dormant since 1954.127 
124. See text accompanying notes 112 & 113 supra. 
125. The most common reason is the fear of undisclosed or contingent liabili­
ties. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 10, ~ 11.63, at 11.67 n.155. 
126. Assuming an arms-length agreement, this would be based on a § 1012 cost 
basis. 
127. Much of the confusion in this area has developed since the enactment of 
the statutory recapture provisions in 1962. Since these recapture sections override §§ 
336 and 337, the regulations to § 334(b)(2) should have been amended or clarified. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Prior to the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 
different forms of transferring assets from one corporation to an­
other often produced different tax consequences despite the simi­
larity of economic result. The buyer's choice of a particular form 
controlled his eventual basis in the acquired assets, while the sel­
ler's choice influenced the amount of proceeds distributable to its 
shareholders. The 1954 Code sought, through sections 337 and 
334(b)(2), to assure the parties equal tax treatment, whether the as­
sets were purchased directly from the corporation or indirectly 
through a purchase of all the seller's outstanding stock. The intro­
duction of statutory recapture provisions and the application of tax 
benefit concepts operated to upset this parity. Not only was the tax 
benefit rule applied only to the direct asset form of acquisition, to 
the seller's detriment, but additionally a conflict between govern­
ment policy and judicial interpretation of statutory recapture and 
tax benefit recoveries rendered the buyer's basis subject to specu­
lation. 
Both Tennessee-Carolina and Smith admirably continued the 
crusade toward a return to parity of tax treatment. Tennessee­
Carolina's application of the tax benefit rule to a stock purchase 
form of acquisition and Smith's analysis of the basis rules pursuant 
to section 334(b)(2) have illustrated a limited or rough parity of tax 
treatment, albeit not in the amount of tax paid. 
Unfortunately, courts are limited to the issues as pre­
sented and cannot deal with such concepts as parity in a broad, 
sweeping fashion. As a result, certain basic problems are left 
unresolved, leaving tax planners with indefinite guidelines. While 
parity, if only by chance and not by design, may yet be restored, it 
is apparent that the Eighty-third Congress, upon enacting the 
"Anti-Court Holding Co." statute, section 337, and codifying the 
Kimbell-Diamond principle, section 334(b)(2), envisioned a much 
smoother mechanism to handle this problem. 
